Court: Supreme court
Subject: Specific Relief Act
Date of Judgment: Jul 31, 2026
V.N.A.S Chandran v S Venila and others: 2026 INSC 776-
Facts of the Case
- Agreement to Sell: Executed on 1 April 2004.
- Consideration: ₹2.25 crore; purchasers paid ₹85 lakh advance.
- Disputes: Arising over payment schedule and completion date.
- Termination: Defendant No.1 terminated the agreement.
- Criminal Complaints: Filed by both sides, later closed.
- Suit: Plaintiffs sought specific performance, or alternatively refund of ₹2 crore with interest.
- Trial Court: Decreed suit in the alternative (refund).
- High Court: Reversed, ordered execution of sale deed.
- Supreme Court: Appeal filed by defendant/appellant.
Issues
- Did the plaintiffs establish continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
- Did their conduct disentitle them to the equitable relief of specific performance?
Ratio Decidendi
- Equitable Relief: Specific performance is discretionary, not automatic.
- Readiness & Willingness: Must be continuous; cannot be proved merely by producing funds at appellate stage.
- Conduct: Plaintiffs’ inconsistent stands, involvement in third-party transactions, criminal proceedings for recovery of advance, and failure to show financial readiness at the relevant time weighed against them.
- Delay: Nearly two decades since the agreement militates against granting specific performance.
- Clean Hands Doctrine: Equity demands plaintiffs approach court with clean hands; their conduct fell short.
Outcome
- Supreme Court allowed appeals.
- High Court’s decree for specific performance set aside.
- Trial Court’s order (refund alternative) restored.
Key Takeaways
- Continuous readiness and willingness is a strict requirement under Section 16(c).
- Delay and inconsistent conduct can bar equitable relief even if limitation period is met.
- Courts balance fairness and practicality—two decades of lapse makes specific performance inequitable.
- Reinforces principle: specific performance is not a matter of right, but of discretion.
This case neatly aligns with the Supreme Court’s recent trend of emphasizing equitable discretion in property disputes.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 2(54) JJ Act, 2015
Date of Judgment: Jul 21, 2026
X V. STATE OF BIHAR (2026 INSC 728):
Facts
- Appellant: Juvenile accused of committing an offence punishable with minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
- Juvenile Justice Board (JJB): Conducted preliminary assessment under Section 15 JJ Act, 2015; divergent opinion on child’s mental/physical capacity.
- On complainant’s appeal, matter transferred to Children’s Court under Section 18(3) for trial as adult.
- Juvenile challenged maintainability, arguing offence did not qualify as “heinous offence” under Section 2(54) JJ Act.
- Contention: Life imprisonment should not be equated with a fixed term of seven years or more.
- High Court rejected contention; juvenile appealed to Supreme Court.
Issues
- Does an offence prescribing minimum punishment of life imprisonment fall within the definition of a heinous offence under Section 2(54) JJ Act, 2015?
Ratio Decidendi
- Section 2(54) JJ Act: Heinous offence = offence punishable with minimum imprisonment of seven years or more.
- Court held:
- Minimum punishment of life imprisonment necessarily exceeds seven years.
- Therefore, such offences squarely fall within definition of heinous offence.
- Rejected argument that life imprisonment cannot be equated with a term of years.
- Emphasized statutory focus on minimum penalty prescribed, not whether expressed as fixed term.
- Referred to Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat (2023 SCC OnLine Guj 3119) for factors in preliminary assessment.
- Discussed appellate court’s role under Section 101(2) JJ Act.
Outcome
- Preliminary assessment and transfer to Children’s Court held legally sustainable.
- Appeal dismissed.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 340 CrPC
Date of Judgment: Jul 21, 2026
PRABHAKAR YESHWANT MASRAM V. SOU TULA NAMDEORAO JAIPURKAR (2026 INSC 724):
Facts
- Parties: A litigant and his advocate in a civil property dispute.
- They filed a memorandum of appeal and stay application containing certain statements.
- Opposing party alleged these were false/incorrect.
- Appellate Court: Directed criminal prosecution under Sections 193, 199, 200 IPC (perjury‑type offences).
- High Court: Not only upheld but expanded findings, recording that a false affidavit was filed and that prosecution was expedient.
- Appellants challenged before Supreme Court.
Issues
- Does a wrong statement in pleadings amount to a false statement under Sections 199 and 200 IPC, justifying criminal prosecution?
- Can courts direct prosecution during pendency of substantive proceedings?
Ratio Decidendi
- Distinction clarified:
- Wrong statement = inadvertence, mistake, typographical error.
- False statement = deliberate assertion known to be untrue, made with intent to deceive or gain advantage.
- Prosecution requires prima facie finding of deliberate falsehood, not mere error.
- First court only found “wrong statements,” not deliberate falsehood → prosecution order unsustainable.
- High Court’s expansion of findings was impermissible; appellate court cannot improve order under appeal.
- Reaffirmed Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005 INSC 129):
- Complaint under Section 340 CrPC should normally be filed after conclusion of substantive proceedings, not during pendency.
- Prevents misuse of perjury proceedings to delay adjudication.
Outcome
- Supreme Court quashed prosecution orders.
- Reiterated that courts must proceed with substantive case instead of diverting into perjury complaints prematurely.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 294(b) IPC
Date of Judgment: Jul 18, 2026
MANI @ SUBRAMANIYAM V. STATE (2026 INSC 719):
Facts
- Appellant involved in an altercation in a public place.
- Allegedly used vulgar and abusive language, assaulted complainant with a billhook (fractured nasal bone = grievous hurt), and threatened him with words to the effect: “You had escaped this day. I will not rest until I hack you.”
- Special Court: Convicted under Sections 294(b), 326, 506(ii) IPC and SC/ST Act.
- High Court: Acquitted under SC/ST Act, but upheld IPC convictions.
- Appeal before Supreme Court.
Issues
- Does mere use of vulgar/abusive language amount to obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC?
Ratio Decidendi
- For conviction under Section 294(b) IPC, two elements must be proved:
- Accused committed an obscene act or uttered obscene words/song/ballad in or near a public place.
- Such act/words caused annoyance to others.
- Obscenity ≠ vulgarity/abuse/profanity.
- Mere use of swear words, profanities, or vulgar expletives, however distasteful, does not amount to obscenity in law.
- In absence of proof that words were obscene in the legal sense and caused annoyance, conviction under Section 294(b) cannot stand.
Outcome
- Conviction under Section 294(b) IPC set aside.
- Conviction under Section 326 IPC (grievous hurt with dangerous weapon) and Section 506(ii IPC (criminal intimidation)) affirmed.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 335 BNSS, 2023
Date of Judgment: Jul 17, 2026
STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. KADER KHAN (2026 INSC 718):
Facts
- FIR lodged alleging victim was abducted from a disco in Kolkata, threatened at gunpoint, gangraped, and thrown from a moving car.
- Five accused named; three arrested early, two (including appellant) absconded.
- Chargesheet filed against those in custody; supplementary chargesheet later against absconders.
- Victim deposed in 2013 during trial of first three accused.
- Victim died on 13 March 2015.
- After appellant’s arrest, prosecution sought to admit victim’s earlier deposition under Section 33 Evidence Act read with Section 299 CrPC.
- Trial Court allowed; High Court set aside; State appealed to Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether a formal magisterial order recording “absconding status” is required under Section 299 CrPC before deposition can be used against an absconding accused.
Ratio Decidendi
- General rule: Witness must be examined in accused’s presence.
- Section 299 CrPC is a statutory exception for absconding accused when witness is dead or unavailable.
- Two factual prerequisites:
- Accused is absconding.
- No prospect of immediate arrest.
- No statutory requirement for a formal magisterial order recording these facts before deposition.
- What matters is whether these essentials were established at the time of deposition.
- In this case:
-
- Proclamation issued in 2012.
- Chargesheet showed absconding status.
- Deposition in 2013.
- Arrest only three years later.
- Victim died in 2015.
- Prerequisites satisfied; deposition admissible.
- Court noted Section 335 BNSS, 2023 aligns with Section 299 CrPC.
Outcome
- Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal.
Restored Trial Court’s order admitting victim’s earlier testimony
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 294(b) IPC
Date of Judgment: Jul 17, 2026
MANI @ SUBRAMANIYAM V. STATE (2026 INSC 719):
Facts
- Appellant involved in an altercation in a public place.
- Allegedly used vulgar and abusive language, assaulted complainant with a billhook (fractured nasal bone = grievous hurt), and threatened him with words to the effect: “You had escaped this day. I will not rest until I hack you.”
- Special Court: Convicted under Sections 294(b), 326, 506(ii) IPC and SC/ST Act.
- High Court: Acquitted under SC/ST Act, but upheld IPC convictions.
- Appeal before Supreme Court.
Issues
- Does mere use of vulgar/abusive language amount to obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC?
Ratio Decidendi
- For conviction under Section 294(b) IPC, two elements must be proved:
- Accused committed an obscene act or uttered obscene words/song/ballad in or near a public place.
- Such act/words caused annoyance to others.
- Obscenity ≠ vulgarity/abuse/profanity.
- Mere use of swear words, profanities, or vulgar expletives, however distasteful, does not amount to obscenity in law.
- In absence of proof that words were obscene in the legal sense and caused annoyance, conviction under Section 294(b) cannot stand.
Outcome
- Conviction under Section 294(b) IPC set aside.
- Conviction under Section 326 IPC (grievous hurt with dangerous weapon) and Section 506(ii IPC (criminal intimidation)) affirmed.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: BSA
Date of Judgment: Jul 15, 2026
LAKSHMI V. GOPI & ORS. (2026 INSC 709):
Facts of the Case
- Plaintiff and defendants were siblings.
- Their mother died on 27.08.2011.
- Plaintiff filed a partition suit, claiming ignorance of a registered Will dated 22.03.1999 under which the mother allegedly bequeathed property to defendants 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- Civil Court: Held the Will was not proved under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and passed a preliminary decree dividing property into 10 shares (plaintiff entitled to 2/10th).
- High Court: Reversed Civil Court’s decree, upheld Will.
- Supreme Court: Appeal filed by plaintiff.
Issues
- How should courts determine the genuineness of a Will?
Ratio Decidendi (Guidelines laid down by SC)
- Sanctity of Wills: Proof of a Will occurs after testator’s death, hence requires special scrutiny.
- Signature of Testator: Must be established under Section 67 Evidence Act, with recourse to Sections 45 & 47 if needed.
- Attestation: Will must be attested under Section 63 ISA — two attesting witnesses required.
- Sound Mind: Testator must be of sound mind under Section 59 ISA, proved accordingly.
- Examination of Witness: At least one attesting witness must be examined in court.
- Judicial Questions: Court must ask:
- Did the testator sign the Will?
- Did he/she understand its nature?
- Did he/she understand the effect of dispositions?
- Did he/she sign knowing what it contained?
Outcome
- Appeal allowed.
- Matter remitted to High Court for fresh hearing.
Key Takeaways
- Proof of Will = strict compliance with Sections 59 & 63 ISA + Section 67 Evidence Act.
- Suspicious circumstances demand heightened judicial scrutiny.
- Courts must ensure the Will represents the true, free, and informed wishes of the testator.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: BSA
Date of Judgment: Jul 14, 2026
R. VERONICA & ANR. V. RUDRAYANI DEVAKI (D) THROUGH LRS. S. SATHA KUMAR & ORS. (2026 INSC 703):
Facts of the Case
- Dispute: Civil property ownership claimed through a registered sale deed.
- Plaintiff: Filed suit asserting absolute title and possession based on the sale deed.
- Defendant: Denied execution, alleged fraud.
- Trial Court: Decreed in favour of plaintiffs.
- First Appellate Court: Reversed Trial Court’s decree.
- High Court: Restored Trial Court’s decree.
- Supreme Court: Appeal filed by defendants.
Issues
- Must a registered sale deed be proved by examining an attesting witness under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
Ratio Decidendi
- A sale deed is not a document required by law to be attested.
- Section 68 applies only to documents where attestation is mandatory (e.g., Wills).
- The mere presence of attesting witnesses on a sale deed does not trigger Section 68.
- Therefore, proof of a registered sale deed does not require examination of attesting witnesses.
Outcome
- Appeal allowed.
- Matter remitted back to the High Court for rehearing.
Key Takeaways
- Sale deeds ≠ Wills: Attestation is optional for sale deeds, mandatory for Wills.
- Section 68 Evidence Act: Applies only to documents legally requiring attestation.
Registered sale deeds: Carry presumption of validity; proof does not hinge on attesting witness testimony.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Date of Judgment: Jul 14, 2026
VENKATESHA & ANR. V. K.M. VENKATAMUNIYAPPA (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. (2026 INSC 705):
Facts of the Case
- Original Owner: Thimmadasappa owned land in Survey No. 1/4, sold in 1971.
- Chain of Title: Property conveyed through successive registered sale deeds, reaching K.M. Venkatamuniyappa (plaintiff) in 1973.
- Re‑grant: In 1982, Government re‑granted a different property (Survey No. 162) to Thimmadasappa.
- Rectification Deed (1997): Executed between plaintiff and his vendor, claiming the 1973 deed wrongly mentioned Survey No. 1/4 instead of Survey No. 162.
- Problem: Thimmadasappa (original transferor) was not a party to this rectification deed.
- Suit: Plaintiff claimed title over Survey No. 162 based on rectification deed.
- Trial Court: Dismissed suit.
- First Appellate Court: Reversed dismissal.
- High Court: Affirmed appellate decree.
- Supreme Court: Appeal by Thimmadasappa’s sons.
Issues
- Can a rectification deed substitute one property with an entirely different property without the participation and consent of the original transferor?
Ratio Decidendi
- A rectification deed is meant only to correct mistakes in an existing document.
- It cannot substitute or alter the identity of the property conveyed.
- Such fundamental alteration requires participation and consent of the original transferor.
- A subsequent purchaser alone cannot change the subject matter of an earlier conveyance.
- Plaintiff’s claim further weakened by failure to seek mutation for nearly 10 years after executing rectification deed.
Outcome
- Supreme Court allowed the appeal.
- Set aside judgments of First Appellate Court and High Court.
- Restored Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 19(1) JJ Act, 2015
Date of Judgment: Jul 13, 2026
SAGAR V. STATE OF HARYANA (2026 INSC 692):
Facts
- Appellant was 16 years 6 months old at the time of offence (October 2018).
- Accused of participating in an assault leading to death.
- Since offence was heinous and he was above 16, the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 JJ Act, 2015.
- JJB opined he had sufficient mental and physical capacity → case transferred to Children’s Court under Section 18(3).
- Children’s Court straightaway conducted Sessions trial without passing mandatory order under Section 19(1) deciding whether child should be tried as adult.
- Convicted under Section 302 IPC, sentenced to 14 years RI.
- High Court affirmed conviction.
- Appeal before Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether failure of the Children’s Court to pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) JJ Act, 2015 vitiates the entire trial.
Ratio Decidendi
- Section 19(1) JJ Act, 2015 imposes a mandatory obligation on Children’s Court:
- Must independently apply its mind.
- Must pass a reasoned order deciding whether child should be tried as adult.
- This determination governs the nature of proceedings and cannot be bypassed.
- Relying on Thirumoorthy v. State (2024) 12 SCC 307, Court held:
- Non‑compliance with Section 19(1) renders subsequent trial legally unsustainable.
- Trial conducted as adult without such order is vitiated.
Outcome
- Conviction and sentence set aside.
- Appellant acquitted.
- Supreme Court directed that all Children’s Courts must invariably pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) before commencing trial of a child transferred by JJB.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 19(1) POCSO Act
Date of Judgment: Jul 09, 2026
AAA V. LINDA SEMA (2026 INSC 675):
Facts
- Victim: 8‑year‑old girl, sexually assaulted in November 2019 by a senior student.
- Disclosure: Victim told her elder sister, a friend, and later the Headmistress (Respondent No. 1) and other school staff.
- School’s response: Conducted their own “verification,” including examining the child’s private parts, decided not to report, and instructed silence.
- FIR later registered; chargesheet filed against juvenile and school staff under Sections 176, 201, 120B IPC and Section 21(2) POCSO Act.
- Trial Court discharged staff; High Court affirmed discharge.
- Supreme Court appeal followed.
Issues
- Does direct information from a child victim about sexual abuse constitute “knowledge” under Section 19(1) POCSO Act, thereby triggering mandatory reporting duty without independent verification?
Ratio Decidendi
- Section 19(1) POCSO Act: “Knowledge” includes awareness based on credible information received directly from the child victim.
- Duty to report is immediate; no independent inquiry or verification is permitted before reporting.
- Section 21 POCSO Act: Failure to report by any person (other than a child) attracts criminal liability.
- Applying this:
- Headmistress, having received direct disclosure, had “knowledge” and was legally bound to report.
- Her discharge was set aside; she is liable to prosecution under Section 21 POCSO Act and Section 176 IPC.
- Other staff who did not receive direct disclosure were rightly discharged.
Outcome
- Supreme Court allowed appeal in part.
- Discharge of Headmistress set aside → liable to prosecution.
- Discharge of other teachers/staff upheld.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Date of Judgment: Jul 06, 2026
SARDARI LAL V. BISHAN DASS & ORS. (2026 INSC 669)
Facts of the Case
- Testator: Chhajju Ram, an illiterate agriculturist, died intestate and childless.
- Widow: Bhambo Devi filed suit claiming exclusive ownership as sole Class I heir.
- Dispute: Defendants relied on a registered Will allegedly executed by Chhajju Ram in their favour, claiming they cared for him and his wife.
- Trial Court: Decreed in favour of widow, holding Will surrounded by suspicious circumstances.
- First Appellate Court: Affirmed Trial Court’s decree.
- High Court (Second Appeal): Reversed findings, upheld Will.
- Supreme Court: Appeal filed by widow.
Issues
- Who bears the burden to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that the Will was executed with free will and full understanding of its contents?
Ratio Decidendi
- Since the testator was illiterate, a heavy burden lay upon the propounders of the Will to prove:
- Free will,
- Full understanding of contents,
- Absence of fraud or undue influence.
- Suspicious circumstances (disposition in favour of non‑relatives, complete disinheritance of widow) demanded circumspect scrutiny.
- Mere examination of attesting witnesses is not sufficient; propounder must dispel doubts and satisfy judicial conscience that the Will truly represents the testator’s wishes.
Outcome
- Supreme Court allowed the appeal.
- Set aside High Court’s judgment.
- Restored Trial Court’s decree in favour of widow Bhambo Devi.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 193(8) BNSS
Date of Judgment: Jul 01, 2026
SHAURYA SUNIL KUMAR SINGH V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2026 INSC 666):
Facts
- Appellant arrested on 13 July 2025 in a CBI probe into cyber fraud, phishing scams, money laundering, and mule bank accounts.
- Chargesheet filed on 2 September 2025 before Special Judge, CBI — within statutory 60/90‑day period.
- Copy supplied to appellant on 23 September 2025.
- Appellant argued prosecution failed to file additional copies of chargesheet required under Section 193(8) BNSS for supply to accused → claimed chargesheet incomplete.
- Filed application for default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS.
- Special Court rejected; High Court affirmed.
- Appeal to Supreme Court.
Issues
- Does non‑filing of additional copies of chargesheet under Section 193(8) BNSS entitle accused to default bail?
Ratio Decidendi
- Distinction drawn between:
- Non‑filing of chargesheet within statutory period → triggers indefeasible right to default bail.
- Non‑compliance with directory requirement of filing additional copies → procedural lapse, does not revive default bail.
- Once chargesheet is filed within time, right to default bail ceases.
- Section 193(8) BNSS held directory, not mandatory in this context.
- Procedural defects in supply of copies cannot be equated with non‑filing of chargesheet.
Outcome
- Appeal dismissed.
- Conviction not disturbed.
- Court directed appellant’s regular bail application to be considered on merits.
Court: Supreme court
Subject: Section 244 CrPC
Date of Judgment: Jul 01, 2026
NEERAJ GUPTA V. PARDEEP KUMAR BANSAL (2026 INSC 660):
Facts
- Following an altercation, appellant’s father died.
- Police did not register FIR → appellant filed application under Section 156(3) CrPC.
- Proceedings initiated under Section 200 CrPC.
- Magistrate recorded pre‑summoning evidence, summoned accused, and committed case (including Section 302 IPC) to Sessions Court.
- Charges framed only against one accused.
- High Court in revision remanded matter to Magistrate, holding that prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC had to be recorded before committal.
- Complainant challenged this before Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether in a complaint case involving offences exclusively triable by Sessions Court, the Magistrate must record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case under Section 209 CrPC.
Ratio Decidendi
- Section 244 CrPC applies only to warrant cases triable by Magistrate.
- It has no application where offence is exclusively triable by Sessions Court.
- Under Section 209 CrPC, Magistrate’s role is administrative:
- Ensure statutory compliance (supply of documents under Sections 207/208 CrPC).
- Commit case to Sessions Court.
- Magistrate is not required to evaluate evidence or conduct pre‑trial inquiry.
- Requiring evidence at committal stage would force witnesses to depose twice, contrary to legislative intent (old committal inquiry abolished under 1898 Code to expedite trials).
Outcome
- Supreme Court set aside High Court’s remand order.
- Restored revisions for fresh consideration on merits.
- Directed expeditious disposal.
